Between A Rock and a Hard Place — Afghanistan Reflections

The first foreign policy “crisis” that the next U.S. President will face when he or she takes office on January 20th, 2017 will be Afghanistan.

After 15 years of intense U.S. support including $115 billion for direct civilian and security (military and police) assistance, the situation in 2016 has been described by one senior U.S. government official as an “eroding stalemate.” That’s optimistic. We are losing whatever has been achieved there and the Afghan government is slowly collapsing under the Taliban onslaught and its own ineptitude driven by corruption. (The actual “total cost of war and reconstruction” has been estimated to be $783 billion by the Cost of War project at Brown University.)

On October 30th the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), released its 33rd quarterly report to the U.S. Congress on the status of the U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. As the report summarizes,

“The insurgency is the most immediate and visible threat to a viable central government in Afghanistan. The less-dramatic and slower-acting, but still existential, threat is the corroding effect of corruption, which diverts money from vital purposes, undermines security and public services, saps the economy, erodes public trust and support, and in varied ways nourishes the insurgency. Like the insurgency, corruption is an enemy that can be hard to pin down and difficult to defeat.”

Indeed. The Taliban control more territory now than at any time since their overthrow in 2001 with the Afghan Government controlling only two thirds of the country. Since January 2016 the Taliban have contested five provincial capitals, carried out some of the largest terrorist attacks in the capitol city of Kabul, and have pressed attacks in all 34 provinces of the country with an average of 68 attacks a day. As a result the Afghan army and police forces have incurred about 15,000 casualties so far this year with civilians suffering over 5000 casualties, the highest levels ever recorded. An estimated 1.2 Afghans have been displaced because of the fighting and are living as refugees in their own country with another 85,000 opting to leave the country in the first six months of 2016 alone for the migrant trail to Europe. Adding to the Taliban threat, ISIS has now established itself in two eastern Afghan provinces and Al Qaida operatives are active in seven provinces according to a recent report in “The Guardian.” With opium production also up by 43% in the country, there is no shortage of funds to fuel the insurgency and corruption.

According to a 2016 World Bank report, the social and economic gains achieved with international assistance over the last 15 years are also quickly eroding due to war and corruption.

“Poverty, unemployment, underemployment, violence, outmigration, internal displacement, and the education gender gap have all increased, while services and private investment have decreased. High levels of crime and corruption undermine Afghanistan’s delivery of public services, deter private investment, and are the by-product of weak institutions.”

The current U.S. administration has opted to leave 8400 troop in Afghanistan in 2016 continue in a support role to the Afghan army, down from a high of 100,000 in 2010. On the civilian side of reconstruction the U.S. continues to pour money into the country. At the Brussels Afghanistan “Donors Conference” in early October, the international community pledged another $15 billion in support, of which the U.S. is the largest contributor. Given the abysmal results achieved so far, isn’t it time to re-evaluate U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan? Recently a group of U.S. generals and former U.S. ambassadors to Afghanistan have announced that a “generational commitment” of assistance was still required of the American people toward Afghanistan to see it securely to the end goal of….what?

With conditions deteriorating rapidly, I am convinced that this will be the first foreign policy crisis faced by the next U.S. president and a decision must be made. What might their options be?

1. Stay the Course:

Under this option the U.S. would continue to stave off the complete collapse of the Afghan state (as it is doing now) by providing minimal resources, both military and civilian, while hoping the Afghan army and government will improve its performance enough to hold the Taliban at bay, pursue an eventual political settlement with the Taliban, and allow for a gradual U.S. withdrawal years from now.

The consequences of this option is essentially more of the same, i.e. lots of money expended with declining results. The American people will not, and should not accept this.

2. Increase the Commitment:

This option would basically reverse the declining commitment of the current U.S. administration and return to the early days of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan by committing whatever resources are required to not only stave off defeat, but push back the Taliban and strengthen the government to the point of self-sufficiency while pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

The consequences of this option would require more resources than option one and return to a strategy that has already been proven a failure. The American people should not accept this option either.

3. Pull out:

Under this option, the U.S. would change its mission in Afghanistan drastically and all but entirely pull out after 15 years of failure to achieve any lasting policy objectives there.

The consequences of this action would result in the collapse of the Afghan military and government, and a Taliban takeover of most of the country. It would also result in an immediate return to the civil war similar to the pre-9/11 era when the Taliban were fighting the “Norther Alliance” and other insurgent groups (funded by outside powers) for complete control of the country. Any minimal social gains achieved over the last 15 years would evaporate, an already dismal economy would collapse, and the out migration of Afghans from the country would accelerate further. ISIS would continue to expand its presence and Al Qaida could once again gain space for its core planning and training activities.

Most Americans have forgotten about Afghanistan (or no longer want to hear about it) and are not aware of the ongoing costs in American lives and resources. It’s time for the next President to make a choice and explain it to the American people.